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DEFECTS IN CONSENT AND DIVIDING THE BENEFIT 
OF THE BARGAIN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Jeffrey L. Harrison* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Contract law professors, students, attorneys, and judges know that 
discussions about consent are rarely about consent.  This results from three 
factors.  First, it is the appearance of consent that is necessary to form a 
contract.1  Second, not every manifestation of consent is sufficient to create 
a contract that cannot be avoided.2  Third, interpretations of consent have 
the potential to allow courts to intervene when the benefit of the bargain is 
seen to be unfairly divided or one of the parties is actually worse off as a 
result of the contract.3  This Article assesses the extent to which recent court 
decisions about consent are actually indirect means of addressing unfairness 
with respect to the terms of the exchange.4  Part of the reason for focusing 
on more recent cases is that it is possible that the doctrine of 
unconscionability has replaced more traditional theories as a means of 
addressing questions of fairness.   
The proposition that questions of consent are not really about consent 
may seem extreme, but think about various contexts in which consent 
occurs.  First, A makes an offer to B: “I promise not to harm you if you will 
hand over your wallet.”  B readily consents because he prefers his health to 
whatever is in his wallet.  Second, A, a poorly educated person who grew up 
in poverty, agrees to buy a car at a price that is $5,000 more than the least 
that the salesperson would have accepted.  A consents because he has grown 
up in a social or racial group of people who have been systematically 
exploited.  He has no idea that a lower price is available and views the price 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 * Stephen C. O’Connell Chair and Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. 
 1 Under the so-called “objective” theory of contracts, the parties need not actually consent as long 
as a reasonable person would regard their actions as signifying consent. 
 2 There are a number of doctrines that permit avoidance of a contract.  See infra Part V. 
 3 In this sense it is important to note that contracts typically create a benefit of the bargain.  This is 
the total gain or increase in utility resulting from the exchange.  When the parties actually decide on a 
price, they are deciding how to divide up that benefit.  In effect, they both must agree that the gain is 
divided equitably.  See generally Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed 
Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243 (1948). 
 4 As will be explained, this effort involves an informal, empirical examination of cases from the 
last ten years.  
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as fair because it compares favorably to the prices people he knows have 
paid.5  Third, A, a well-educated and careful person, buys a smoke alarm at 
the market price.  
All three examples involve “consent.”  They differ, however, in the 
factors influencing consent and, thus, whether there is consent for contract 
formation purposes.  What the examples suggest is that, when assessing 
consent, courts engage in a process of creating rules and boundaries with 
respect to acceptable forms of persuasion.6  They legitimize some forms of 
persuasion and delegitimize others.  What is legitimate or not may vary 
with time.7  The range of possible outcomes, and the lack of objective 
limits, have benefits and costs.  The costs arise from the instability created 
by an ever-changing list of what is acceptable or not acceptable.  The 
benefit is the opportunity for courts, which officially do not examine the 
adequacy of consideration, to do exactly that and respond to substantive 
outcomes.  Thus, whether any manifestation of consent is viewed as 
“contractual consent” may be a function, ultimately, of the way in which the 
gains from contract formation are shared.  The focus of this Article is to 
assess the impact of the perceived unfairness of an exchange on decisions 
that the consent itself was not legitimate.  
So-called “defects” in consent, or more accurately a sample of the rules 
that govern legitimate manifestations of consent, are examined.  There are 
many doctrines available under which defects may be identified.  These 
range from instances in which minors enter into contracts to cases of 
material misrepresentation and fraud.8  This Article focuses on three 
specific possibilities: capacity, duress, and undue influence.  These three 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 5 Under the theory of relative deprivation, the satisfaction one feels about an outcome depends on 
the outcomes of members of specific reference groups. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, 
Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445, 460–62 (1994).  See generally Faye 
Crosby, Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce, and Halligan, 73 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 103 (1979); Ted Robert Gurr, Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative 
Evidence, 391 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 128 (1970); William H. Panning, Inequality, Social 
Comparison, and Relative Deprivation, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1983). 
 6 See generally Orit Gan, Contract Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171 
(2013); Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 57 (2012).  
 7 The addition of volitional impairment reflects one such change.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 15 (1981).  
 8 One of the best known cases is Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1968), in which a Florida court came to the assistance of what it described as a “a widow of 51 years” 
who had purchased an excessive number of dance lessons under the theory that there was a 
misrepresentation by instructors with respect to her ability to become an accomplished dancer.  Id. at 
907–09. 
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were selected because they seem to afford courts the most flexibility.  I 
concentrate principally on decisions by courts, but in Part VII, I return to 
the importance of statutory law.9  In fact, as far as policing the limits of 
exchanges, statutory law may be more important.  The objective here, 
however, is to assess whether applications of these doctrines in recent cases 
are sub rosa efforts to address concerns about the balance of the bargain.  
As will be evident in the discussion to follow, a complicating factor is the 
rise of the use of the doctrine of unconscionability.  Reliance on 
unconscionability has the potential to make claims based on capacity, 
duress, and undue influence obsolete.  
The organization is as follows.  Part II provides support for the general 
belief that contract law can and should be applied to achieve outcomes that 
are fair, and examines the relationship of this belief to unconscionability.  
Part III expands on the importance of “consent,” describes the informal 
methodology employed in this Article, and states the hypothesis to be 
tested.  Part IV briefly discusses the difficulty of determining what is meant 
by consent and the critical connection between consent and preferences.  
Part V sets out the black letter law with respect to each doctrine as found in 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Part VI then concentrates on how 
capacity, duress, and undue influence have been employed in the process of 
legitimizing and delegitimizing, and more importantly, in placing limits on 
the terms of an exchange.  Part VII summarizes the findings and explores 
whether much of the work done by investigations of capacity, duress, and 
undue influence has been taken on by applications of unconscionability.  It 
also notes the importance of statutory measures in terms of achieving 
distributive goals.  
Four preliminary points should be noted.  First, the remarks that follow 
are not intended to suggest that there are “true” cases of incapacity, duress, 
and undue influence, and then “faux” cases in which they are 
disingenuously applied to rescue those who find themselves on the 
unfavorable end of a bargain.  It is possibly more generous and correct to 
say that when a case is a close one with respect to capacity, duress, or 
undue influence, notions of equity may come into play.  Second, the 
findings and some of the discussion may reflect no more than my own 
biases and limitations.  Except for cases related to specific research 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 9 This law includes cooling-off periods, limits on pricing, and disclosure requirements, to name a 
few.  I do not include the U.C.C. art. 2 (2003) or the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 
1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988).  Although “statutory,” they do not fit the general 
description of laws designed to protect the less powerful.  
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projects,10 I am personally most familiar with contract cases found in 
teaching materials.  I was surprised at the extent to which the cases in those 
contexts are often not representative of actual disputes,11 but this may 
simply be a result of expectations formed by years of exposure to casebook 
selections.  Third, another surprise was the number of what I thought were 
“easy” cases that were still appealed or in which a particular argument was 
made at all.12  In many instances, if a law student had responded to an exam 
question by making the same argument, his or her grade would have been 
low.  Finally, as already noted, the relevance of any of the traditional 
doctrines that address consent—capacity, duress, etc.—may be waning.  
This is considered at the end of this Article.13  
II.  CONTRACT LAW AS A LEVELING TOOL 
It is, of course, no secret that courts use a number of contract doctrines 
to achieve what are perceived as fair outcomes.  One of the starkest 
reminders of this is found in the comments to section 2-302 of the U.C.C.: 
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police 
explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be 
unconscionable.  In the past such policing has been accomplished by 
adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and 
acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy 
or to the dominant purpose of the contract.  This section is intended to 
allow the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or 
particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 10 See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Influence of Law and Economics Scholarship on Contract 
Law: Impressions Twenty-five Years Later, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (2012); Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73 (1988). 
 11 This is a different matter than whether they are accurate in terms of describing the law or how it 
should be applied. 
 12 There are many examples of what I mean by “easy.”  One that is simple to explain involves a 
non-compete clause signed when the employee, the holder of a Master of Science in Construction 
Science, was hired by an environmental consulting firm.  Singh v. Batta Envtl. Assocs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 
19627, 2003 WL 21309115, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2003).  It was the same clause agreed to by dozens 
of other employees.  Id. at *5.  While employed, the employee did, in fact, open his own firm in 
competition with his employer.  Id. at *1.  When the non-compete clause was raised, the employee 
claimed that he was under duress when he signed it because if he had not taken the job, he would have 
had to go back to India.  Id. at *5.  He also claimed that he was unduly influenced because he had a prior 
relationship with the employer, and it would have been “awkward” not to sign whatever was requested.  
Id. at *6.  Both arguments were rejected, but I suspect the attorney still collected his or her fee.   
 13 See infra Part VII. 
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unconscionability.14 
Thus, the inclination of courts to inject notions of fairness into their 
opinions seems to be a part of the general understanding of how contract 
law is applied.  The actual sections on unconscionability in both the U.C.C. 
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Second Restatement”)15 
reduce the pressure on courts to interpret more conventional contract rules 
in order to achieve desired ends.16  In fact, the two prongs of the 
unconscionability test—substantive and procedural—seem to fit most cases 
of defects in consent.17  As a Pennsylvania court explains: 
[A] contract or term is unconscionable, and therefore avoidable, where 
there was a lack of meaningful choice in the acceptance of the challenged 
provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party asserting it.  The 
aspects entailing lack of meaningful choice and unreasonableness have 
been termed procedural and substantive unconscionability, respectively.  
The burden of proof generally concerning both elements has been 
allocated to the party challenging the agreement, and the ultimate 
determination of unconscionability is for the courts.18 
This view connecting unconscionability to defects in consent is actually 
quite old.  As early as 1889, the United States Supreme Court observed that 
a contract was unconscionable if it was “such as no man in his senses and 
not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair 
man would accept on the other.”19  
These comments about unconscionability, while supporting the view 
that courts do intervene to assist disadvantaged parties, lead to a sticky 
question for this particular undertaking: Why not have only 
unconscionability as the safety valve?  The procedural requirement of 
unconscionability would seem to encompass capacity, duress, and undue 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 14 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a 
(1981). 
 15 The U.C.C. governs the sale of goods.  See U.C.C. § 2-102.  The Second Restatement represents a 
summary of the common law rules generally applied by United States courts.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS intro. 
 16 See U.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178. 
 17 See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).  
 18 Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119–20 (Pa. 2007) (footnote omitted) 
(citations omitted). 
 19 Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 
28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.) 100; 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155). 
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influence.  And, to the extent courts intervene on the basis of outcomes, the 
substantive element of unconscionability would apply.  In short, 
unconscionability has the potential to replace all of the traditional methods 
of assessing consent.  What this means is that a modern assessment of 
capacity, duress, and undue influence is incomplete without some attention 
to unconscionability.  One of the findings of this Article is that 
unconscionability may be gradually eliminating the need for application of 
the older doctrines.  
III.  THE QUESTION THROUGH AN ECONOMIC LENS AND THE  
HYPOTHESIS TESTED 
It may be useful to think about the question raised here in the context of 
an everyday contract.  Suppose Tom is willing to sell his car but for no less 
than $5,000.  Jane is willing to buy it but will pay no more than $7,000.  
Economists would say a contract curve exists between $5,000 and $7,000.20  
To a contracts professor there is a $2,000 benefit of the bargain.  At any 
price between $5,000 and $7,000, both parties will be better off.  A 
necessary part of making this contract is to strike a bargain about how to 
divide the $2,000.21  It is as though the parties, having $2,000 in front of 
them, must agree on how to split the $2,000 before the exchange can be 
“approved.”  One’s curiosity is piqued if Jane ends up paying very close to 
$7,000 or Tom takes an amount a few pennies more than $5,000.  Some of 
the reasons for this may be entirely legitimate.  Others may not be.  For 
example, Jane may be quite wealthy, averse to shopping or haggling, or 
drawn to something special about this particular car.   
On the other hand, Tom may say: “Pay $7,000, or I will tell your 
employer that you have been stealing.”  Here Jane may pay $7,000, or even 
more, and a red flag is raised.  Why would Jane pay this amount if she has 
any leverage at all or unless she is buying something other than the car?  In 
this case, she would be buying the car and Tom’s silence.  In short, 
ultimately what is at issue is why one party would agree to an exchange that 
results in a very small share of the benefit of the bargain, or that even leaves 
him or her worse off.22  When the Janes of the world do end up with very 
little of the benefit of the bargain or are actually worse off, the outcomes do 
not conform to what one would expect from a fully functioning, rational, 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 20 See Harrison, supra note 5, at 473–74. 
 21 See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 243–45. 
 22 See Harrison, supra note 5, at 449 (discussing the possibility that self-esteem and relative 
deprivation play a role in cases of unequal outcomes). 
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and self-interested adult.  Issues of capacity, duress, and undue influence 
immediately come to mind.  
These ideas lead to the following hypothesis: In recent reported cases, 
courts are more likely to find a lack of capacity, the presence of duress, or 
an exertion of undue influence when an exchange seems excessively to 
favor one party over another or over a third party.23  It is important to note 
that this hypothesis also stands for the proposition that courts are unlikely to 
find a defect in consent when there appears to be no unfairness in the 
exchange.  I have attempted to apply a very informal methodology in which 
I examine cases decided in the period from 2002 to mid-2013.  I selected 
cases in which courts cite the sections of the Second Restatement that bear 
on each of these matters.24  This is a small sample, and there are certainly 
cases that address these issues without including a Second Restatement 
citation.  Still there is no a priori reason why these cases would not be 
representative of, or serve as a useful proxy for, all cases. 
Nevertheless, the effort must be viewed as subjective and informal 
because an objective standard for acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis 
cannot be formulated.  There is no way to quantify how much a court is 
influenced by reservations about distributive matters or whether it is 
influenced at all.  In addition, how does one weigh five cases involving 
small possible inequities in which a court does not intervene against one 
involving an obvious inequity in which the court does intervene?  Also, it is 
impossible to know if the perceived inequity was necessary for the finding.  
After all, assigning causation when it can only be inferred is risky.  Thus, 
the results of this Article, as is common in legal scholarship, are 
impressions more than anything else, and the discussion is designed to 
explain those impressions.  
One limitation of the methodology cannot be avoided and should be 
noted.  Because all the data were drawn from reported and unreported cases, 
the individuals claiming capacity, duress, or undue influence sensed 
injustice and were knowledgeable enough to consult attorneys.  No doubt 
there are many contracts that divide the benefit of the bargain unevenly and 
that involve capacity, duress, and undue influence that are never challenged.  
For a variety of reasons, ranging from ignorance to financial hardship, 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 23 It is important to note that in many of the following cases, the party appealing to the court is not a 
party to the contract.  In these instances, the third party is arguing that one party to the contract was 
impaired and, but for that impairment, the third party would have benefited.  
 24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 15, 174, 177 (1981) are those relevant sections.  
There are instances beyond those cited here in which a section is cited but really has no significant role 
in the decision.  These cases were not examined closely. 
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litigation is not pursued.  Consequently, there is a socioeconomic bias 
within the sample.  Courts do not select the cases or the parties, and without 
the “right” parties distributive goals cannot be achieved and rules about 
acceptable forms of persuasion cannot be formulated.25  In short, from this 
survey it is not possible to generalize about how courts would react to cases 
brought by those less likely to litigate.  Nor should any inferences be drawn 
about the frequency of capacity limitation, duress, or undue influence.26  
IV.  CONSENT AND PREFERENCES 
Although this effort is about “defects” in consent, it is useful to 
contextualize those defects by noting other limitations on matching what 
people do with what they really want.  Knowing that individuals have 
manifested consent is not the same as knowing what that means or how 
important it is.  Ideally, rational, fully-informed people consent as a way to 
express their preferences when faced with a choice.  If this applies across 
the board, general welfare rises.27  As it turns out though, the connection 
between consent and preference is fragile.28  That connection depends on a 
number of assumptions, facts, and personal traits.29  Moreover, if the link 
between consent and preference is sometimes weak, the moral rationale for 
deference to consent also weakens. 
One personal story expresses this aptly, and perhaps every reader has 
experienced something similar.  As a younger professor I was chatting with 
an office neighbor, and the conversation turned to yearly salary increases.  
He indicated that each year when he received his letter indicating what his 
salary would be the next year, he always felt good about even a modest 
increase.  He was even foolish enough to thank the dean.  In fact, you could 
say that he consented to the new arrangement.  For the sake of this story, 
assume that the increases were 3% per year.  After several years, and 
completely by accident, he discovered that his neighbor at the time was 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 25 See Harrison, supra note 5, at 464–65.  This is, however, likely to be an inefficient and 
incomplete response.  More promising, perhaps, are statutory responses.   
 26 Except, perhaps, to infer that these influences are far more frequent than the small number of 
cases here suggest. 
 27 This provides an economic and moral basis for contracts—Pareto efficiency.  If both parties are 
better off and no one is worse off, overall utility is increased and there should be little in the way of 
moral objection. 
 28 See THOMAS F. COTTER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: POSITIVE, NORMATIVE 
AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 133–41 (3d ed. 2013); Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of 
Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241, 242 (1973). 
 29 See Sen, supra note 28, at 241. 
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receiving 4% increases.  He was angry and, although hardly in a position to 
resign, his consent, in terms of feeling he had made a choice that he was 
pleased with, was gone.  When he complained to the dean, the dean was 
quick to point out that he had always been grateful for the raise. 
His consent was contingent on not knowing a tiny piece of information.  
In fact, all our decisions and our consents are based on what we know, and 
whether we like it or not, what we do not know.  Consent may reflect a 
preference, but often that preference is a very “thin” one, resting on 
incomplete or even inaccurate information.30   
Consider another problem, which is closer to the focus of the Article.  If 
you have young children, you know that supermarkets sometimes put candy 
at the child’s eye level in the checkout lanes.  The child may pick up the 
candy and insist on having it bought.  The parent, wanting to avoid a scene, 
may buy it.  Has the parent consented to purchase the candy?  Evidently so.  
On the other hand, does that reveal the preference of the parent?  Perhaps 
not if the preference of the parent is not to have been forced to make the 
choice in the first place.  In fact, this may simply be a case of extortion.  Of 
course, the parent may not give in to the child.  One could say he or she was 
not coerced; does it make a difference?  The preference was not to have had 
to make the choice. 
As these examples suggest, a number of factors create a wedge between 
preferences and consent.  Perhaps an ideal system of contract law would 
respond to all of these factors.  Reliance on doctrines ranging from capacity 
to undue influence can close the gap between choices and preferences.  
Nevertheless, reconciling consent with actual preferences remains a puzzle.  
V.  THE BLACK LETTER LAW 
Defects in consent may arise from characteristics of the party seeking to 
avoid a contract or the actions of those with whom he or she contracts.  In 
the first category are issues that relate to capacity.  Section 15 of the Second 
Restatement reads as follows: 
(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a 
transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect 
 
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 30 See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations 
of Legal Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1997); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal 
Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4 (1994). 
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consequences of the transaction, or 
 
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the 
transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.[31] 
 
(2) Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without 
knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the power of avoidance under 
Subsection (1) terminates to the extent that the contract has been so 
performed in whole or in part or the circumstances have so changed that 
avoidance would be unjust.  In such a case a court may grant relief as 
justice requires.32 
Section 15 employs the common standard of “reasonableness” and 
clearly opens the door to a battle of the experts with respect to capacity.  It 
also identifies two types of capacity—cognitive and volitional.33  
Interestingly, it includes some of its own guidelines with respect to when 
the fairness of the bargain is relevant.  For example, volitional impairment 
allows avoidance by one party only if the other party had reason to know of 
the impairment.34  Thus, even the person who is not fully able to express his 
or her preferences accurately by manifesting consent will not be able to 
avoid the contract in the absence of advantage-taking.  In addition, there is 
protection “as justice requires” for parties who have partially performed.35  
Two sections of the Second Restatement focus on the influence that 
contracting parties have on each other.  The first, section 175, concerns 
duress: “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper 
threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the 
contract is voidable by the victim.”36  The Second Restatement also lists 
instances when a threat is improper.37  These examples are of limited use 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 31 This is called the volitional test and is a newer standard than the cognitive test found in 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a) (1981).  Not all states have adopted the volitional 
test.  It is possible for the outcome of an assessment of capacity to depend on the standard adopted in a 
particular state.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Davis, 89 P.3d 1206, 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam).  
 32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. § 15(1)(b).  Avoidance is also permitted in situations of impairment due to the use of alcohol 
or other drugs.  Id. § 17. 
 35 Id. § 15(2). 
 36 Id. § 175(1).  Under the other subsection, a threat by a third party may also make the contract 
voidable, but not if the contracting party acts in good faith and without reason to know of the threat and 
gives value or materially changes position.  Id. § 175(2). 
 37 The Second Restatement provides, in pertinent part:  
  (1) A threat is improper if  
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since they are inclusive enough to allow a finding of impropriety whenever 
a court deems it appropriate.38  Interestingly, the fairness of the exchange 
can be a consideration when deciding if a threat is improper and, thus, 
whether duress was applied.39  
In the case of undue influence, the Second Restatement rule is: “Undue 
influence is unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the 
person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between 
them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner 
inconsistent with his welfare.”40  Further assistance in understanding how 
the concept is applied is found in the Second Restatement’s commentary, 
which indicates that factors to be considered include “the unfairness of the 
resulting bargain, the unavailability of independent advice, and the 
susceptibility of the person persuaded.”41 
Together these rules describe circumstances under which consent is the 
product of illegitimate factors.  Central to all of the rules is the notion of 
compulsion—whether from within or without.  The rules also have few 
                                                                                                                           
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or a tort if 
it resulted in obtaining property, 
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution, 
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad faith, or 
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract with 
the recipient. 
  (2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and 
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the 
party making the threat, 
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is significantly 
increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or 
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends. 
Id. § 176.  
 38 See id. 
 39 Id. § 176(2). 
 40 Id. § 177(1).  The relationship leading to undue influence is often termed “confidential.”  See, 
e.g., Russo v. Miller, 559 A.2d 354, 357–58 (Me. 1989).  When the undue influence is applied by a third 
party, it is more difficult to avoid the contract: “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by one 
who is not a party to the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim unless the other party to the 
transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the undue influence either gives value or relies 
materially on the transaction.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(3). 
 41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. b.  The comment goes on to say that these 
factors alone are not controlling.  Id. 
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limiting principles.  An improper threat is what a court says it is.  Capacity 
issues lead to a battle of the experts, since there is no objective notion of 
having or lacking capacity other than, perhaps, a lack of consciousness.  
Similarly, no one can identify the point along the influence continuum at 
which influence becomes “undue.”  Most interestingly, all of the Second 
Restatement sections invite courts to examine the fairness of the exchange 
in determining whether to apply the doctrines of capacity, duress, or undue 
influence.42  
VI.  THREE DOCTRINES OF LEGITIMACY 
A.  Capacity 
Using the search term described above,43 I found twenty recent cases 
discussing capacity in the context of contractual avoidance.44  In terms of 
setting rules for influence or persuasion, the rules with respect to capacity 
work in a fashion similar to strict liability.  No means of persuasion are safe 
or acceptable when the opposite party lacks capacity.45  The Second 
Restatement captures the breadth of authority courts have to determine 
capacity or allow it to be determined: “Proof of irrational or unintelligent 
behavior is essential; almost any conduct of the person may be relevant, as 
may lay and expert opinions and prior and subsequent adjudications of 
incompetency.”46  
Perhaps the best known American case in which a judicial perception of 
unfairness influenced a finding that a contracting party lacked capacity is 
Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board.47  Admittedly it also shaped my 
expectations and, consequently, rejection or acceptance of the hypothesis 
identified earlier.  Ortelere, a retired teacher, elected to accept her pension 
pay-out in the form of a higher periodic payment for the rest of her life as 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 42 See id. §§ 12, 176–177.  
 
43
 WESTLAW CLASSIC, http://web2.westlaw.com (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s15 & capacity 
& after 2002”) (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).  
 44 See, e.g., Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003); Schmidt v. Shah, 696 F. Supp. 2d 44 
(D.D.C. 2010); Biggs v. Eaglewood Mortg., LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Md. 2008), aff’d per curiam, 
353 F. App’x 864 (4th Cir. 2009); Steward Mach. Co. v. White Oak Corp., 462 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. 
Conn. 2006); Belcher v. Queen, 39 So. 3d 1023 (Ala. 2009); Indus. Commercial Elec., Inc. v. McLees, 
101 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2004); In re Estate of Marquis, 822 A.2d 1153 (Me. 2003); Spicer v. Balt. Gas & 
Elec. Co., 831 A.2d 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003); Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. 
2012); In re Marriage of Davis, 89 P.3d 1206 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam). 
 45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. d. 
 46 Id. § 15 cmt. c.  
 47 Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969). 
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opposed to a smaller payment that would extend through the life of herself 
or her husband, whichever would be longer.48  Shortly after the election, she 
died, meaning that payments ceased.49  A few hundred dollars had been 
paid from a retirement reserve in excess of $60,000.50  Her husband asked 
to have her election avoided based on her incapacity due to volitional 
impairment, and the court agreed.51 
It is difficult not to see the holding as resting primarily on the fact that 
many years of expected payments were, in effect, forfeited.  Ortelere made 
what amounted to a bet and lost.  She appeared to have understood what she 
was doing, and the family finances at the time made the election seem 
reasonable.52  Faced with the fact that she had asked questions that indicated 
a high degree of rationality, the court opted to use volitional impairment as 
the basis for its judgment.53  The precise basis for a finding that she lacked 
control of her actions is not clear but, again, the decision itself seems to be 
governed by the loss of expected pension payments.  Volitional impairment 
is particularly well suited to reactions based on perceived unfairness.  In 
fact, according to another court, the key to volitional impairment is whether 
“the transaction in its result is one which a reasonably competent person 
might have made.”54  In effect, competency can be inferred from the 
substance of the exchange.  This policy is noted more recently in a 
Delaware case in which the court explained that “in certain circumstances, 
courts have considered the adequacy of consideration as an indicium of 
mental incompetence.”55 
If this interpretation of Ortelere is correct,56 then the question for the 
purposes of this analysis is whether Ortelere is representative of a more 
general policy of allowing avoidance based on perhaps weak evidence of a 
true lack of capacity when a party has simply made an unfortunate choice 
that means suffering by way of forfeiture.57  A survey of recent cases 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 48 Id. at 461. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 463. 
 51 Id. at 466. 
 52 Id. at 466–68 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 464–66 (majority opinion). 
 54 Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 303 (Mass. 2012) (quoting Krasner v. Berk, 319 N.E.2d 
897, 900 (Mass. 1974)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 55 Bettis v. Premier Pool & Prop. Mgmt., LLC, No. 6858-VCN, 2012 WL 4662225, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 26, 2012) (footnote omitted). 
 56 Although a casebook favorite, Ortelere has been rarely cited outside of New York. 
 57 Ortelere is distinguished in Marston v. United States, Civil Action No. 10-10437-GAO, 2012 WL 
4529940 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2012), in which a party attempted to avoid a settlement agreement.  The 
court noted the reasonableness of the settlement, given that there may have been no recovery at all.  Id. 
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indicated that the policy of considering the fairness of the outcome is more 
pronounced in Ortelere than it is generally.58  This is very likely explained 
in part by the facts of Ortelere.  There the advantaged party was a state 
agency, and the disadvantaged party was supporting a spouse.59  The 
possibility that courts are more likely to find a defect in consent when an 
agency or organization is involved is generally supported by other recent 
cases.60 
For example, far more common than the Ortelere fact pattern are 
disputes between family members concerning the actions by a mother or 
father.61  This is not surprising because, all other factors being equal, the 
elderly are most prone to capacity issues.  Interestingly, in these recent 
cases, courts seem less likely to find a defect in consent.62  For example, in 
Dubree v. Blackwell, the executor and beneficiary of a will (and nephew of 
the testator) challenged the contractual capacity of the decedent when it 
was discovered that she had deeded her house and bank accounts to her 
brother-in-law prior to her death.63  Expert witnesses testified on both sides 
of the case, and the jury found against the executor with respect to the 
question of capacity.64  On appeal, the court affirmed, noting that the 
beneficiary of the contracts had been a lifelong friend and had cared for the 
decedent for nearly ten years.65  
Cases like Dubree illustrate the difficulties of interpretation.  For 
example, perhaps the case is as simple as it appears on its face—the 
deceased did not lack capacity.  On the other hand, it may represent a battle 
between private parties for whom the funds involved would have been a 
windfall. Unlike Ortelere, there would be no obvious reason for favoring 
one, as a distributive matter, over the other.66  Finally, and in a manner that 
                                                                                                                           
at *24.  
 58 See Marston, 2012 WL 4529940, at *24 (remarking on the reasonableness of the settlement); 
Bettis, 2012 WL 4662225, at *3 (noting that some courts do consider the fairness of consideration when 
determining mental capacity); Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d at 306 (finding no evidence that the settlement was 
unreasonable or that a competent person would not have agreed to it).  Part of the danger is that opinions 
may reflect only the conclusion that a party has made sufficient allegations to survive a motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment.  This is an imperfect indication of the actual policy.   
 59 Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 461–62 (N.Y. 1969).  
 60 See, e.g., Duke v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. W2010-01534-COA-R3-CV, 2011 
WL 864321, at *8–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2011) (holding that an arbitration agreement with a 
nursing home was invalid due to patient’s incapacity when signing power of attorney). 
 61 See, e.g., Dickson v. Long, No. M2008-00279-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 961784, at *2–7 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2009) (involving a step-mother’s capacity to sign power of attorney agreement and 
convey land to step-daughter instead of step-son). 
 62 See cases cited supra note 44.  This is not to say there has been a change.   
 63 Dubree v. Blackwell, 67 S.W.3d 286, 288 (Tex. App. 2001).  
 64 Id. at 288–90. 
 65 Id. at 288. 
 66 Compare Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969), with Dubree, 67 S.W.3d 
286. 
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would be consistent with the hypothesis posed here, perhaps the court (and 
the jury at the trial court) felt that injustice would result if the caretaker for 
ten years were deprived of the payment that he received.67  Again, it is 
dangerous to infer causation, but the pattern suggests that without 
unfairness, the doctrine of lack of capacity is less likely to be successful.  
Family disputes were also involved in Duke v. Kindred Healthcare 
Operating, Inc.,68 but here the presence of an organization may have played 
a role, as it did in Ortelere.  In this case, a person with Alzheimer’s disease 
was admitted to a long-term care facility.69  The admissions documents 
were signed by the patient’s sister, who had power of attorney.70  These 
documents provided for arbitration.71  When a lawsuit was filed by the 
patient’s wife claiming neglect and abuse by the healthcare facility, the 
defendants moved to compel arbitration.72  The wife objected claiming that 
the patient lacked capacity when he signed the documents granting his sister 
power of attorney.73  Here the court, without discussing the financial 
consequences of the decision, found that there was overwhelming evidence 
of a lack of capacity.74  Were the consequences of the actual contract 
relevant?  Although there was no direct discussion of it, it is possible that 
the opinion was influenced by a generally negative view of compulsory 
arbitration.75  From that perspective, the case has an Ortelere-like quality, in 
that the disadvantaged party was pitted against an organization without any 
obvious fairness-based arguments to support its position.  The decision can 
be viewed as supporting the hypothesis that other factors were likely at 
work. 
Dickson v. Long lends some support to the idea that the individual-
versus-organization context is more likely to result in a finding of a lack of 
capacity.76  The case involved the grant of power of attorney to, and the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 67 The court also upheld the decision that there was no undue influence.  Dubree, 67 S.W.3d at 291. 
 68 Duke v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. W2010-01534-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 864321 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2011).  
 69 Id. at *1. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at *8–10.  
 75 See infra Part VII.A. 
 76 Dickson v. Long, No. M2008-00279-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 961784 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 
2009); see also Carpenter v. Sims, No. E2007-0622-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4963008 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 7, 2007) (finding that the deceased seller of a condominium was mentally competent and the sale 
should not be set aside as requested by the beneficiaries of the will); Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the decedent was mentally competent 
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subsequent sale of property by, a stepson, which the natural son 
unsuccessfully challenged.77  Under the terms of the appointment by the 
deceased, the sale could only be made to a daughter.78  There was 
conflicting evidence with respect to the mother’s capacity, but the court 
ruled that she was competent.79  At the risk of reading too much into the 
opinion, the court may have been influenced by the fact that the dispute was 
ultimately between two siblings, and that the signing took place in the 
presence of a notary, which the court viewed as offering some protection 
for the mother.80  Again, although it may be best to take these decisions at 
face value, it is noteworthy that the dispute was ultimately one in which 
there was no clear inequity affecting the party whom allegedly lacked 
capacity.81  
As one would expect, when indications of a lack of capacity are 
extreme, it does not matter whether a relatively impersonal organization is 
involved.  A case in point is In re Estate of Marquis.82  Prior to her death, 
the decedent had changed the beneficiary of various annuities from her 
estate to a grandnephew in recognition of his regular visits and willingness 
to run errands.83  Before the change, the proceeds would have gone to 
twelve family members as well as two charities.84  Her personal 
representative claimed that she lacked capacity to change the annuity 
beneficiary, even though the change came after an extended discussion with 
a financial advisor who testified that she was “well spoken.”85  The court 
relied on substantial testimony that the decedent had demonstrated a 
decreasing sense of awareness and found a lack of capacity.86  Bills were 
left unpaid, and the decedent had delusions that her dog had nursed her to 
health and that her television was talking to her.87  This may be a simple 
instance of a court applying a standard of competence when there was no 
inequity to influence it either way.  The only thing that casts some doubt on 
the face value interpretation is that courts have consistently noted that one 
can have cognition problems as long as those problems are not in effect 
                                                                                                                           
when she changed her life insurance beneficiary from her estranged husband to her brother).  
 77 Dickson, 2009 WL 961784, at *1. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at *4, *7. 
 80 Id. at *7. 
 81 See id. at *11–12. 
 82 In re Estate of Marquis, 822 A.2d 1153 (Me. 2003). 
 83 Id. at 1155.  A change in beneficiary is, in effect, a change in a contract and requires contractual 
capacity.  Id. at 1156. 
 84 Id. at 1155. 
 85 Id. at 1155–56. 
 86 Id. at 1158. 
 87 Id.  Evidently these beliefs were found to be untrue.  
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when the contract sought to be avoided was made.88  In this case, the 
evidence available suggested that she did understand the contract 
modification that she was making.89  In fact, it is hard to square the notion 
of a “lack of capacity” with a decision to change the beneficiary to a 
specific family member.90  
A relatively rare case in which family members are not contesting the 
contracts made by a deceased relative is Knoll v. Merrill Corp., in which an 
employee, Knoll, made a claim of wrongful discharge.91  Later, he signed a 
release, and then claimed that he lacked capacity to sign the release.92  In 
actuality, the discharged employee had been depressed and confided in his 
employer.93  Eventually, the discharge stemmed from this condition or 
efforts to treat it.94  Relying on Ortelere, the court held that there was a 
question of fact with respect to whether the plaintiff’s condition led to 
volitional impairment.95  The court noted that, like Ortelere, the mere fact 
that Knoll understood enough to ask questions did not settle the question of 
capacity.96  It is worth noting that here again the individual-versus-
organization pattern is present. 
In contrast to Ortelere and Knoll, two recent cases have rejected claims 
of incapacity in the context of settlements following mediation.97  In neither 
case did the settlement appear to result in a substantially one-sided 
outcome, and the parties were represented by counsel.98  This is consistent 
with the policy of favoring settlement of disputes.99 In addition, the 
outcomes may be understood by noting that, whether or not the parties had 
capacity as a medical matter, both were supervised or cared for in a way 
that maintained procedural fairness.100  
A few tentative conclusions follow from these cases and others that 
were examined in the time period.  Whether viewed as evidence of a lack of 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 88 See id.  
 89 See id. at 1155–56. 
 90 Id. at 1156. 
 91 Knoll v. Merrill Corp., No. 02 Civ.566 CSH, 2003 WL 21556942, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2003), 
vacated pursuant to settlement (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2005). 
 92 Id. at *9. 
 93 Id. at *2. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at *11–12. 
 96 Id. at *11. 
 97 Marston v. United States, Civil Action No. 10-10437-GAO, 2012 WL 4529940, at *24 (D. Mass. 
Sept. 30, 2012); Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 297 (Mass. 2012).  
 98 See Marston, 2012 WL 4529940, at *12–14; Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d at 300–01.  
 99 See, e.g., Williams v. First Nat. Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910). 
 100 See generally Marston, 2012 WL 4529940; Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d 296. 
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capacity or not, some cases suggest that the balance of the exchange does 
influence the decision to apply the doctrine.101  On the other hand, two 
factors that cut in different directions seem also to influence the outcome of 
the cases.  When the advantaged party is an organization, as opposed to a 
private party, courts seem more willing to find that the contracting party 
lacked capacity.102  The underlying notion is that the consequences are less 
onerous to the losing party when that party is an organization.  On the other 
hand, relatives or other individuals who feel disadvantaged by contractual 
decisions seem to have less luck with their claim that the contracting party 
lacked capacity.103  This makes sense because, in most instances, the 
relatives are squabbling over a windfall, and it would be difficult to claim 
that one side or the other is more deserving or has suffered an injustice by 
virtue of the distribution made.  In fact, the party who supposedly lacked 
capacity has no interest at this point, and the relatives are simply arguing 
over the “spoils.”   
B.  Duress 
Using the search term for duress104 yielded eleven cases.105  Section 175 
of the Second Restatement recognizes that unfairness in the outcome of the 
bargain is part of the duress analysis.106  This reflects the generally held 
view.  For example, in 1947, John P. Dawson wrote: “For it is through 
duress and related ideas that private law has dealt most directly with 
problems raised by inequality in bargaining power.”107  And, in 1953, an 
Idaho court noted that to be “voidable because of duress, an agreement must 
not only be obtained by means of the pressure brought to bear, but the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 101 See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text. 
 102 See supra notes 76–81, 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 103 See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. 
 104 WESTLAW CLASSIC, supra note 43 (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s174 & duress & after 
2002”).  
 105 See, e.g., D’Antuono v. Serv. Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308 (D. Conn. 2011); Wright v. 
Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d per curiam, No. 07-5328, 2008 
WL 4068606 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2008); Sw. La. Healthcare Sys. v. MBIA Ins. Corp., No. 05-1299, 
2007 WL 979933 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2007); Weinberg v. Interep Corp., Civil No. 05-5458(JBS), 2006 
WL 1096908 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2006); Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); 
Schultz v. Schultz, 867 So. 2d 745 (La. Ct. App. 2003); In re Estate of Rosasco, 927 N.Y.S.2d 819, 2011 
WL 1467632 (Sur. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table decision); Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 
S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2005).  Because the sample is small, an additional sample from 1996 to 2001 was 
examined.  WESTLAW CLASSIC, supra note 43 (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s174 & duress & after 
1995 & before 2002”).  That sample did not suggest that the cases reported here were atypical. 
 106 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). 
 107 John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 253 (1947).   
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agreement itself must be unjust, unconscionable, or illegal.”108  Given that 
there appears to be a long-running consensus that duress is a response to 
unequal bargaining power resulting in unfair outcomes, it is interesting to 
examine cases for the purpose of determining if this “ideal” is the reality.109  
What a survey of recent cases suggests is that courts are far from anxious to 
find duress.  If anything, the opposite is true: Courts seem more inclined to 
disassemble duress claims and find little or no basis for them.  
As these cases are examined, a cautionary note bears repeating.110  In 
these reported and unreported cases, few if any of the parties claiming to 
have experienced duress appear to be from lower and less educated 
socioeconomic classes.  Ironically, parties who may have the best chance to 
present a compelling case are likely to be the same people who either do not 
feel that they were under duress, may not have aspirations to be treated 
more fairly, or are not even aware that some form of legal recourse may 
exist.111 
Attempting to discern any concern for equity by a court under the  
rubric of duress is difficult, in part because duress requires the party 
attempting to avoid the contract to clear a number of hurdles.  Not only 
must the threat be improper, it must leave no reasonable alternative.112  The 
threat must also be the cause of the consent.113  In addition, the person 
claiming duress may be viewed as ratifying the agreement if he or she waits 
too long before raising the issue.114  Further, if the threat comes from a third 
party, duress is unavailable if the advantaged party did not know of the 
threat, acted in good faith, and either gave value or relied on the consent.115  
Finally, in recent cases duress is most often raised when a party to the 
settlement of a legal claim later regrets the outcome and attempts to avoid 
the agreement, or in the context of a divorce.116  Courts do not seem 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 108 Newland v. Child, 254 P.2d 1066, 1072 (Idaho 1953). 
 109 No effort is made here to distinguish economic duress from other forms of duress.  Both deal with 
the issue of illegitimate uses of power.  See generally Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of 
Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171 (2013).  For a discussion of the role of stress in duress cases, see 
Hila Keren, Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (2013). 
 110 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 111 See Harrison, supra note 5, at 469–80. 
 112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981). 
 113 Id. § 175 cmt. c. 
 114 See, e.g., Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nev. Nat. Bank of S.F., 270 U.S. 438, 443–44 (1926) (holding 
that when a contract is made under duress, it is voidable by the contracting party, and failure of that 
party to disaffirm effectively waives the right to bring a duress claim). 
 115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e. 
 116 See infra notes 117–22, 125–33, 151–58, 174–75 and accompanying text. 
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especially receptive to duress claims in these circumstances.117 
Considerations of equity may conflict with the goal of encouraging 
settlement.   
A representative example is Biliouris v. Biliouris, in which a  divorced 
wife attempted to show that she was under duress when signing an 
antenuptial agreement.118  At the time of the marriage, she was thirty-five 
years old, had three children, and was pregnant with the child of the future 
spouse.119  The agreement was presented to her one week before the 
marriage.120  She signed against the advice of counsel and was crying at the 
time.121  Evidently, the threat was that the husband would not marry her 
unless the agreement was signed.122  Under the terms of the agreement, 
there was to be no alimony, and each party would keep the property that 
they brought to the marriage.123  In finding no duress, the court noted that 
the agreement was fair at the time it was made, that the wife did have time 
to consider it, and that 
[t]he wife was an educated professional who had a demonstrated earning 
capacity at the time she executed the agreement in 1992.  Although the 
parties agreed that the wife would leave her job in order to be a “stay-at-
home” mother, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the wife 
would be incapable of working and earning income to support herself in 
the event of a divorce in the future.124 
It is also important to note that the wife retained $100,000 of her own 
assets, received child support payments, and held 80% of the equity in the 
home.125  
The terms of the contract and the background of another disappointed 
settling party were evidently relevant in Gascho v. Scheurer Hospital.126  
Mrs. Gascho was an employee of a hospital at which her husband also 
worked.127  He was having an affair with a supervisor at the hospital.128  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 117 See infra notes 123–24, 134–39, 159–60, 176–81 and accompanying text. 
 118 Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).   
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 689 n.1. 
 121 Id. at 689 & n.2. 
 122 Id. at 689. 
 123 Id. at 690. 
 124 Id. at 695.  
 125 Id. at 691–92, 696. 
 126 Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2010) (Sutton, J.). 
 127 Id. at 979. 
 128 Id. at 980. 
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This eventually led to an altercation between Mrs. Gascho and the 
supervisor, and the offer of a severance package for Mrs. Gascho.129  Under 
the terms of the agreement, Mrs. Gascho agreed to resign and release any 
claims, including those under Title VII.130  She was given twenty-one days 
to consider the proposal.131  During that period, her husband evidently made 
a number of threats to “destroy [her] life” if she did not sign.132  She 
eventually signed in what was characterized as a “civil” meeting.133  A year 
later, she sought to avoid the agreement.134 
In finding a lack of duress, the court noted that Mrs. Gascho had been a 
nurse for thirty years and, at times, had managerial duties.135  More 
importantly, the court found no improper threat.136  The agreement was with 
the hospital, which had not threatened her and which seemed to have acted 
in good faith.137  The court viewed her claim to be that she had no choice 
because she did not want to risk turning down the offer, and therefore 
losing the benefits if her potential lawsuit was unsuccessful.138  According 
to the court, “that is not how it works.”139  The risk of economic hardship is, 
according to the court, part of the bargaining process.140 
Both Gascho and Biliouris suggest that status and education are 
relevant.141  Another example is Samuelson v. Covenant HealthCare 
System.142  There, a registered nurse was fifty-seven years old at the time 
that she stopped working and began collecting short-term disability 
benefits.143  She had worked for the same employer for twenty-five years.144  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 129 Id. at 980–81. 
 130 Id.  The Title VII claim related to sexual harassment, but the report of the case does not elaborate 
on the basis for that claim.  
 131 Id. at 982. 
 132 Id. at 980 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133 Id. at 981 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 983. 
 137 Id. at 983–85.  She claimed that the improper threat existed by virtue of the fiduciary relationship 
she had with her husband, but the court noted that the husband was not a party to the case.  Id. at 984.  
The threat of a third party may be the basis for avoidance, but there are exceptions.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e (1981); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Claywell Elec. 
Co., No. HHD-CV-05-4015464, 2008 WL 2039145, at *3–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2008). 
 138 Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 983. 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id.  
 141 See generally id.; Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
 142 Samuelson v. Covenant HealthCare Sys., No. 10-13422-BC, 2011 WL 5143156 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 
31, 2011). 
 143 Id. at *2. 
 144 Id. at *1. 
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When the disability benefits ran out, she began collecting retirement 
payments.145  By retiring when she did, she was entitled to $36,000 for 
healthcare expenses.146  Later, she was informed that because of her early 
retirement, some of her benefits offset each other.147  She objected, claiming 
that she elected to retire when she did due to duress resulting from the fact 
that had she not retired, she would have lost the $36,000 payment.148  The 
court noted that she was simply forced to make a choice; nothing deprived 
her of her free will.149  The court also devoted much of the opinion to 
describing why her decision was economically beneficial.150  The 
implication is that the fairness of the exchange was influential.151   
As Biliouris suggests, marital issues often give rise to claims of 
duress.152  In Hardey v. Metzger, the husband sought to avoid a property 
settlement agreement with his wife, arguing that it was the result of 
extortion.153  The source of the dispute was a $200,000 loan that the 
husband had obtained by using as collateral the property owned solely by 
the wife.154  She was unaware of this, as he had forged her signature.155  The 
debt became an issue in the context of their divorce.156  He promised to pay 
the debt directly, and she signed papers recognizing the debt and extending 
the due date.157  In the period leading up to the signing, her attorney 
threatened to commence civil proceedings against the husband.158  She also 
told the husband she would “send [him] to jail.”159  The court found that the 
husband had not proven duress because he was unable to prove “contractual 
causation”—that he signed because of the threats.160  Again, on its face, the 
actual agreement appears to have been a fair one.161 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 145 Id. at *3. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at *5, *7. 
 149 Id. at *6–7. 
 150 Id. at *7. 
 151 See id. at *6–8. 
 152 See generally Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
 153 Hardey v. Metzger, Record No. 2628-07-4, 2008 WL 3895686, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 
2008). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160 Id. at *5. 
 161 See id. 
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Settlements associated with employment termination or a threatened 
termination also lead to claims of duress.  For example, in Wright v. 
Foreign Service Grievance Board, Wright was a foreign service officer who 
filed a grievance in response to low performance rankings.162  When he still 
had the right to appeal an adverse decision, the Service offered to employ 
him until he reached the twenty-year mark and expunge his record if he 
would drop all further claims.163  The extension amounted to a few months 
of additional employment.164  Wright was given five days to decide.165  He 
later attempted to avoid the agreement on the basis of duress.166  He 
complained of the short time period for his decision and the fact that he was 
threatened with immediate dismissal and a loss of retirement benefits.167  
Here, the court reasoned that by working until his retirement and then 
collecting retirement benefits, Wright had ratified the agreement.168  As a 
general matter, waiting too long before raising a duress claim almost 
certainly means that it will fail.169 
A claim of duress was also rejected on the basis of the presence of a 
reasonable alternative in Osborne v. Howard University Physicians, Inc.170  
The case involved a tenured university physician who signed a new 
employment contract that effectively reduced his earnings.171  His 
employer, Howard University, explained that it was forced to alter the 
payment structure for university physicians due to financial problems.172  
The threat was that the employee would lose his position if he did not sign 
the new contract under which he also relinquished any claims under the 
original contract.173  The court listed a number of alternatives including 
finding alternative employment or filing an action asking a court to enjoin 
his termination.174  Here again, the sophistication of the party likely played 
a role.  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 162 Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166–67 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 163 Id. at 168–69. 
 164 Id. at 166–67, 169. 
 165 Id. at 175 n.7. 
 166 Id. at 174–75. 
 167 Id. at 174. 
 168 Id. at 175; see also Schmidt v. Shah, 696 F. Supp. 2d 44, 64 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that a 
government employee was barred from litigating a duress claim after accepting a settlement). 
 169 See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 515–16 (Mass. 2007).  But see Burd v. 
Antilles Yachting Servs., Inc., 57 V.I. 354, 362 (V.I. 2012) (reversing a finding of ratification on 
appeal). 
 170 Osborne v. Howard Univ. Physicians, Inc., 904 A.2d 335, 341–42 (D.C. 2006). 
 171 Id. at 336–38. 
 172 Id. at 337. 
 173 Id. at 337–38. 
 174 Id. at 341–42. 
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Another instance of “settlement regret” is Nathan v. Calco Duct & Vent 
Cleaning.175  There, a party settled a tort claim for $250,000.176  She then 
alleged that her agreement was the result of duress applied by her 
attorney.177  Two stumbling blocks were evident here.  First, the threat was 
from a third party to the contract.178  As already indicated, this makes the 
claim of duress significantly harder to successfully employ.179  She testified 
that she agreed because she was concerned about the expenses of litigation 
and the possibility that her attorney would withdraw.180  She also consulted 
other attorneys.181  The court noted that the party with whom she settled did 
not know of any possible duress and had relied on her agreement to 
settle.182  Second, the court found that she had effectively ratified the 
agreement by waiting five weeks to raise her objections.183  
One recent case in the sample that deviates from this trend of rejecting 
duress claims is Dorale v. Dorale.184  There, a former wife agreed to sell an 
interest in property she had received under the divorce agreement back to 
her ex-husband.185  The court found there was duress by virtue of her prior 
domestic abuse and fear of physical harm.186  The agreement was reached 
after a contentious, four hour meeting in which a third party also urged her 
to agree.187  Although not raised in the case, the fact pattern may have been 
better suited for the label of undue influence.188  In any event, it appears that 
the court was influenced by the fact that the selling price was about $50,000 
less than the appraised value of the property.189  Dorale is not technically a 
settlement case, and that may explain the court’s greater openness to a 
duress claim.  Interestingly, unlike the prior cases, there was no mention of 
the former wife’s educational background or experience level.190 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 175 Nathan v. Calco Duct & Vent Cleaning, No. X09CV065005942, 2009 WL 3416440 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2009). 
 176 Id. at *1. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at *2–3. 
 179 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e (1981). 
 180 Nathan, 2009 WL 3416440, at *4. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at *3. 
 183 Id. at *4. 
 184 Dorale v. Dorale, 771 N.W.2d 651, 2009 WL 1211969 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 185 Id. at *1. 
 186 Id. at *3–4. 
 187 Id.  
 188 See infra Part VI.C. 
 189 Dorale, 2009 WL 1211969, at *3. 
 190 See generally id. 
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Perhaps indicative of a recent trend to reject claims of duress are two 
prison cases.  In Smith v. Cain, a prisoner claimed that her constitutional 
rights were infringed by the prison.191  She filed a civil rights claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, but eventually entered into a settlement agreement.192  
Six months later she sought to disavow the settlement and claimed that she 
was under duress because the prison warden threatened to have her killed if 
she did not sign.193  The court denied the plaintiff’s request to reinstate the 
lawsuit on the basis of duress.194  The court found the claim of a physical 
threat not credible and also noted that the prisoner had enjoyed the benefits 
of the settlement for six months before complaining.195  Similarly, in Reed 
v. Gallegos, a prisoner who had been abused by guards contracted to 
relinquish his civil rights claims in exchange for a promise to be 
transferred.196  His request to avoid the contract was denied since the abuse 
was not designed to encourage him to sign the contract.197  Instead, the 
guards administering the abuse evidently had other motives.198 
If the cases in this survey are representative, a hypothesis that courts in 
the United States are quick to use the concept of duress to alter substantive 
outcomes would have to be rejected.  It bears noting, however, that the 
parties involved in the cases studied were generally not ignorant or 
deprived, nor did the benefit of the bargain obviously favor one party at the 
expense of the other.  As already suggested, bringing a case based on duress 
requires at least some level of sophistication.  Ironically, perhaps, the more 
sophisticated the party, the less likely the claim will be successful.199  The 
outcomes of these cases are not inconsistent with a tendency to respond to 
unfairness when appropriate.  But, then again, courts have no control over 
which parties appeal for their assistance.  In fact, for the disadvantaged in 
the United States, problems in the bargaining process that are similar to 
duress are most likely addressed by statutory law or fall under the doctrine 
of unconscionability.200  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 191 Smith v. Cain, Civil Action No. 09-0322-JJB-DLD, 2012 WL 4051855, at *2–3 (M.D. La. Aug. 
22, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 4051947 (M.D. La. Sept. 13, 2012). 
 192 Id. at *1. 
 193 Id. at *2. 
 194 Id. at *10. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Reed v. Gallegos, C.A. No. C-07-190, 2008 WL 2714082, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2008). 
 197 Id. at *5.   
 198 Id. at *3. 
 199 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. c (1981). 
 200 See infra Part VII. 
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C.  Undue Influence 
The search term used here for “undue influence”201 produced twenty-
two cases.202  Not all of the cases involve fact patterns that would make it 
possible for a court to apply a corrective touch based on unfairness.  For 
example, in some instances, the parties appear to be distributing what would 
be a windfall to either one.203  In other instances, although perhaps not a 
windfall, it would be difficult to clearly identify the injustice.204  Finally, in 
some instances, “undue influence” is invoked in the context of facts that are 
not remotely close to those described in the Second Restatement.  For 
example, whatever the vices of predatory lending, a person applying for 
such a loan is not likely to be under the undue influence of the lender.205  
A casebook favorite that illustrates the concept and fits nicely into the 
Second Restatement guidelines is Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District.206  
Odorizzi was a school teacher who resigned his position after he was 
arrested on criminal charges of homosexual activity.207  He later attempted 
to avoid the contract on the basis of undue influence.208  The contract was 
signed after a considerable time without sleep, in the evening, in his home, 
and in the presence of his superiors who were threatening him with broader 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 201 WESTLAW CLASSIC, supra note 43 (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s177 & ‘undue influence’ 
& after 2002”). 
 202 See, e.g., Commercial Recycling Ctr., Ltd. v. Hobbs Indus., Inc., 228 P.3d 93 (Alaska 2010); 
Elias Real Estate, LLC v. Tseng, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360 (Ct. App. 2007); Moore v. Woman to Woman 
Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 3 A.3d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); Black v. Powers, 628 
S.E.2d 546 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); In re Estate of Jones, 287 P.3d 610 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); Comeau v. 
Nash, 233 P.3d 572 (Wyo. 2010).   
 203 I have not, for example, pursued the line of cases in which a transfer-on-death agreement or the 
contents of a will are challenged based on the assertion that the beneficiaries unduly influenced the 
testator, either in preparing a will or by virtue of a contract prior to death.  In these instances, the 
equities between the parties over the “spoils” are difficult to identify.  See, e.g., Comeau, 233 P.3d. at 
572. 
 204 For example, the search located Barba v. Seung Heun Lee, No. CV 09-1115-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 
8747368 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009), but there the record available was not sufficient to determine facts 
with respect to undue influence.  The case, however, does have interesting implications, as the parties 
claiming to have been unduly influenced voluntarily attended a Yoga school in which they underwent 
severe deprivation and were told to donate all their belongings to the organization.  Id. at *1–2. 
  205 See Storie v. Household Int’l, Inc., Civil Action No. 03-40268-FDS, 2005 WL 3728718, at *6 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 22, 2005); see also Gengaro v. Local 3144, No. CV54009789S, 2008 WL 2068254, at *2–5 
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Gengaro v. City of New Haven, 984 A.2d 1133 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2009).  Similarly, a partner at Ernst & Young is unlikely to portray herself as an 
“unsophisticated school girl.”  United States v. Fletcher, No. 06 C 6056, 2008 WL 162758, at *11 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J.). 
 206 Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
 207 Id. at 537. 
 208 Id. 
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exposure.209  The court found that there was enough evidence of undue 
influence to merit a trial on the issue.210  As a general matter, undue 
influence involves the domination of one person that results in a choice that 
the subordinate party would not otherwise make.211  With its somewhat 
more flexible definition than duress and capacity, the potential use of the 
doctrine to extract individuals from bargains that seem unfair is obvious.212  
Since undue influence typically applies, if at all, when the 
disadvantaged party is in a weakened state, it might be expected that it 
would be generally found alongside a claim based on lack of capacity.213  
This is not the case.  Similarly, since capacity issues are often raised by 
third parties who stand to benefit from voiding the contract, corresponding 
claims for undue influence might be expected.  In practice, though, it 
appears that parties to a contract are more likely to invoke undue influence 
and third parties more likely to rely on capacity.  The reason for this 
difference is not clear.  One possibility is that an assertion by a party that he 
or she lacked capacity might be stigmatizing and might require possibly 
embarrassing or intrusive medical testimony.  Further, undue influence is 
temporary and situational.214  It is possible that it is a more comfortable 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 209 Id. at 537–38.  The court found that Odorizzi had stated a cause of action.  Id. at 543.  It provided 
the following list of undue influence indicators:  
(1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time, (2) consummation of 
the transaction in an unusual place, (3) insistent demand that the business be finished at 
once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay, (5) the use of multiple 
persuaders by the dominant side against a single servient party, (6) absence of third-party 
advisers to the servient party, (7) statements that there is no time to consult financial 
advisers or attorneys.  If a number of these elements are simultaneously present, the 
persuasion may be characterized as excessive.  
Id. at 541. 
 210 Id. at 543. 
 211 Id. at 540–41. 
 212 As an aside, Odorizzi itself has rarely been cited outside of California. 
 213 The close relationship of undue influence to unconscionability is suggested by the Second 
Restatement: 
[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the 
stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception 
or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real 
alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981). 
 214 See Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 540.   
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admission to make.  A third party might, on the other hand, feel more free 
to make assertions about someone else’s capacity.   
Before examining whether courts appear to be advancing distributive 
goals, two reminders are in order.  First, if courts do seem to pursue these 
goals in the context of undue influence more than in claims of capacity, it 
could be because, as noted above, these cases more frequently involve an 
actual party to the contract in question.  Second, as in duress, when the 
pressure leading to the consent is not applied by a party to the contract, 
avoidance is more difficult.215  The point is that if courts respond to 
distributive outcomes under the rubric of undue influence, one would 
expect the claim to be made by a sympathetic person who was a party to the 
contract and that the pressure came from the party who was unfairly 
advantaged. 
This combination was not frequently found in recent cases and, for the 
most part, the outcomes are quite predictable.  Two cases illustrate the 
importance of the source of the undue influence.  In Chai v. Commissioner, 
a taxpayer claimed to be unduly influenced to agree to extend the 
limitations period with respect to a tax assessment.216  He had not consulted 
an attorney and was advised to agree by a business associate who was also 
the husband of a cousin.217  The undue influence allegedly flowed from this 
relative.218  The court noted that even if the associate had the necessary 
domination, there was no evidence that it was used in a way that interfered 
with the judgment of the contracting party.219  
A similar pattern with, perhaps, a more sympathetic party is found in 
Stoudmire v. U.S. Xpress, Inc.220  Stoudmire, a truck driver, without 
assistance of an attorney, settled a worker’s compensation case.221  Included 
in the settlement was an agreement to release all claims that he may have 
against the employer.222  In fact, at that time, he had a civil rights claim 
pending and had hired counsel for that claim.223  Because he felt the release 
was likely to apply to the civil rights claim, the attorney advised him, 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e. 
 216 Chai v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, 521 (T.C. 2011). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 521–22.  Undue influence by someone who is not a party to the contract is less likely to 
result in avoidance.  See supra Part V. 
 220 Stoudmire v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 2:12cv1055-MHT, 2013 WL 1363484 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 3, 
2013). 
 221 Id. at *1. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
2015] Defects in Consent and Dividing the Benefit of the Bargain 221 
 
evidently quite forcefully, to settle the civil rights claim for a very small 
amount.224  Stoudmire asked to have the settlement avoided on the basis of 
the undue influence applied by his attorney.225  The court denied the request 
noting that facing an overbearing attorney did not rise to the level of undue 
influence.226  What these cases suggest, if anything, is that courts will not 
“reach” to affect a different distributive outcome unless all the necessary 
components of undue influence are present. 
Undue influence is most successful as a method of avoiding a contract 
when the parties have a confidential relationship.227  This finding shifts the 
burden to the party accused of exerting undue influence to show that none 
existed.228  Burden shifting has a huge substantive effect, and the decision 
to make that shift may itself be a function of perceived unfairness.  An 
example of this is seen in Ross v. Hodge, another instance in which the 
fairness of the bargain played a role in the outcome of the case.229  There, a 
relatively unsophisticated business owner, Hodge, hired Bracy to assist in 
applying for federal contracts.230  Hodge eventually purchased a house for 
Bracy to live in.231  The owners were Hodge, Bracy, and Bracy’s girlfriend, 
Ross.232  Eventually, Hodge and Bracy signed their ownership interest over 
to Ross, who, through a series of transactions, sold the property and kept 
the proceeds.233  
Hodge complained that he was led to believe that the property was 
bought for his employees generally and that Bracy and Ross were not 
authorized to have their names listed as co-owners.234  The undue 
influenced flowed from Ross to Hodge.235  The court was obviously swayed 
by the fact that Hodge allegedly could not read,236 and ended up buying the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 224 Id. at *2. 
 225 Id. at *3.  Yet another case in which an attorney is accused of undue influence is Kayla P. v. 
Morgan C., No. 1 CA-JV 09-0190, 2010 WL 987071 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010). 
 226 Stoudmire, 2013 WL 1363484, at *3.  
 227 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. a (1981). 
 228 See, e.g., Haynes v. First Nat. State Bank of N.J., 432 A.2d 890, 897–98 (N.J. 1981); Howard v. 
Nasser, 613 S.E.2d 64, 68–69 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); In re Estate of Duebendorfer, 721 N.W.2d 438, 
446–47 (S.D. 2006).  But see Estate of Reichel, 400 A.2d 1268, 1270 (Pa. 1979) (explaining that 
Pennsylvania law requires more than proof of a confidential relationship before the burden shifts). 
 229 Ross v. Hodge, 58 V.I. 292 (V.I. 2013). 
 230 Id. at 296. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 296–97. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 297–98. 
 235 Id. at 304. 
 236 This was disputed.  Id. at 305. 
222 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:193 
 
house but having no equity in it.237  In addition, he had become close 
friends with Ross.238  The court noted that Hodge was subservient to Ross 
and that a confidential relationship existed.239  At that point the burden 
shifted to Ross to show there was no undue influence—a test she failed.240  
The dissent correctly noted that the lower court and the majority had not 
adhered to the undue influence standards.241  There was no evidence that 
Hodge’s will was overcome nor of any specifics about how and when the 
actual pressure was asserted.242  In effect, it appears the court, shocked by 
the underhandedness of Ross, used “undue influence” as a method of 
correcting an injustice.243 
Similarly, in LeSure v. Andrus, a couple separated after living together 
for ten years.244  During this time, the female half of the couple, Andrus, 
incurred nearly all the expenses associated with the home.245  After a year 
and a half, though, she made the male, LeSure, a co-owner of the 
property.246  After the separation, LeSure sought to assert his half ownership 
interest, and the response was that the transfer was a result of undue 
influence.247  The court noted that a confidential relationship existed at the 
time of the transfer and then found that LeSure had been unable to prove the 
absence of undue influence.248  It is quite possible that the court was also 
influenced by the fact that all payments associated with the property were 
made by Andrus, that she owned the property prior to the relationship, and 
that she had yearly earnings significantly below those of LeSure.249  
Obviously, the existence of a familial relationship can influence the finding 
of a confidential relationship, but it does not always follow.250 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 237 See id. at 304–05. 
 238 Id. at 298. 
 239 Id. at 304. 
 240 Id. at 304–06. 
 241 Id. at 312–14 (Hodge, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 242 Id. at 313. 
 243 See id.  In reality, the case seems more suited for fraud or misrepresentation since Bracy and Ross 
misled Hodge about the consequences of the transactions.  See id. at 313–14. 
 244 LeSure v. Andrus (In re Andrus), Bankruptcy No. 09-13123, Adversary No. 09-01264, 2010 WL 
4809114, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2010). 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at *2. 
 248 Id. at *4. 
 249 See id. at *6. 
 250 See, e.g., Pires v. Pires, Nos. 02 MISC. 282083(CWT), 02E 033 PP(CWT), 0433 CV 
0547(CWT), 02-SP-00569, 2009 WL 3067070 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 25, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, remanded in part, 2011 Mass. App. Div. 23 (Dist. Ct. 2011).  
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The combination of a confidential relationship and advantage taking 
also played a role in the Michigan case of Fick v. Fick.251  Plaintiff, the 
wife, and defendant, the husband, were married in 1994.252  The wife was 
severely injured in 1996, and the husband assumed responsibility for her 
financial transactions.253  Eventually the husband influenced her to sign 
both a mortgage agreement and quitclaim deed resulting in his sole 
ownership of their home.254  He also divorced her without her knowledge.255  
Although there was no direct evidence of the type found in Odorizzi, the 
confidential relationship and the deception by the defendant were enough to 
establish undue influence.256  
Just as a perceived unfairness may influence a court to find that undue 
influence is involved, the opposite is also true: Perceptions of fairness seem 
to defeat the same claims.  In In re Estate of Jones, daughters of a deceased 
couple claimed that, after the husband’s death, the couple’s sons had used 
undue influence to convince the widow to enter into agreements that 
favored the sons at the expense of the daughters.257  It was determined that 
the relationship between the mother and sons was confidential.258  Here, 
however, the court found that the existence of a confidential relationship 
was not enough to shift the burden to the sons to show there was no undue 
influence.259  Principally, the court noted that the exchange between the 
sons and their mother was a “fair bargain.”260  
In a recent case involving a completely different context—child 
custody—it appears that fairness also played a role.261  Here the mother 
complained that undue influence resulted in an agreement to joint 
custody.262  The agreement was a result of voluntary mediation during 
which the mother consulted with her sister, who was a family law 
attorney.263  Nevertheless, it was clear that she was subjected to repeated 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 251 Fick v. Fick, Docket No. 274284, 2008 WL 3540257 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2008) (per 
curiam). 
 252 Id. at *1. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. at *1–2. 
 257 In re Estate of Jones, 287 P.3d 610, 611 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 258 Id. at 616 n.7. 
 259 Id. at 615–18. 
 260 Id. at 616. 
 261 In re Alden, 159 Wash. App. 1008, 2010 WL 5298828 (2010) (unpublished table decision). 
 262 Id. at *3. 
 263 Id.  
224 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:193 
 
phone calls by the husband insisting that she sign.264  There was no 
suggestion that the father was unfit to have custody.265  More importantly, 
the agreement awarded the mother significantly more custody than the 
father.266  Neither the process of reaching the agreement nor the outcome 
suggested that her will was overpowered.267 
Finally, in Kenton v. Foster, the seller of a home became unhappy with 
the contract once she found a buyer willing to pay more.268  In addition to 
the sales price, she was also to receive a “place to live for the earlier of 
seven years or until she received her next installment from the California 
lottery.”269  She claimed that she agreed to the original sales price as a result 
of undue influence.270  She was evidently under some financial pressure 
while waiting for her lottery payment.271  There was no confidential 
relationship between the buyer and seller, nor was there any evidence of 
domination.272  Finally, the court observed, although the selling price may 
have been below market value, the reasons for accepting that price were 
clear.273 
Undue influence actually seems to be a more viable method of 
addressing inequities between the parties than either capacity or duress.  
Unlike capacity, there is typically not a medical condition involved.274  
And, unlike duress, there are not several individual elements that must be 
proven.275  Plus, although it is not clear why this is the case, undue 
influence appears to give rise to less discussion about the sophistication of 
the party seeking to avoid the contract.  One possibility is that duress hinges 
on the lack of a reasonable alternative, which can be viewed as a question 
of what the party should have known to consider, while this is not part of 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 264 Id. at *1, *5. 
 265 See id. at *1–2. 
 266 See id. at *1 (“The agreed upon residential schedule gave [mother] custody 114 hours and [father] 
54 hours on some weeks and, on alternating weeks, gave [mother] 93 hours and [father] 75 hours.”).  But 
see id. at *5 (“[T]he residential schedule roughly divides residential time equally between the 
parties . . . .”). 
 267 See id. at *3–4. 
 268 Kenton v. Foster, No. CV-04-2005-PCT-PGR, 2008 WL 4700626, at *1–4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 23, 
2008).  
 269 Id. at *1.   
 270 Id. at *8. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id.  Sewage had filled the “downstairs” of the home, and there were no utilities when she sold the 
house to the original buyer for less than market value.  Id. at *1, *8. 
 274 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1981); see also supra Part VI.A. 
 275 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175; see also supra Part VI.B. 
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the undue influence analysis.276  Perhaps most important is the finding of a 
confidential relationship.  If a person enters into a confidential relationship, 
the idea of an arms-length bargain does not apply.277  In a sense, the 
influenced party has a right to expect the contracting party not to seek most 
or all of the benefit of the bargain.278  Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to 
infer that, at least in recent decisions, courts are anxious to invoke undue 
influence.  In this sample, however, it was more likely to be relied on than 
capacity or duress.  
VII.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: UNCONSCIONABILITY AND  
STATUTORY MEASURES 
Based on this survey, it is safest to say that imbalance in the benefit of 
the bargain plays only a minor role in cases based on capacity, duress, and 
undue influence.  Courts are more inclined to look for relatively objective 
evidence.279  In some cases, status and background may be as influential as 
the actual bargain.  Perhaps wary of running afoul of the rule that adequacy 
of consideration is not required, courts consider even a very uneven 
distribution of the benefit of the bargain as only evidence that there was a 
problem with consent. 
Does this mean that distributive matters are unimportant in American 
contract law?  Probably not.  In fact, it may be that what would be 
considered under the doctrines of capacity, duress, and undue influence are 
today dealt with by the doctrine of unconscionability or by statutory 
measures.  
A.  Unconscionability 
In Part I, it was noted that contracts which reflected unfairness are more 
likely to be assessed under the doctrine of unconscionability.  Given the 
lack of significant evidence that courts use capacity, duress, and undue 
influence to actively address distributive issues, this possibility seemed 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 276 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (duress), with id. § 177 (undue 
influence). 
 277 See, e.g., Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. 1981) (“When the relationship between the 
parties to an agreement is one of trust and confidence, the normal arm’s length bargaining is not 
assumed . . . .”). 
 278 See id. (“[O]verreaching by the dominant party for his benefit permits the aggrieved party to 
rescind the transaction.  This is so because the presence of a confidential relationship negates the 
assumption that each party is acting in his own best interest.” (citations omitted)). 
 279 See supra Part VI. 
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more promising.  In order to test this explanation, I compared instances in 
which the Second Restatement sections on capacity, duress, and undue 
influence were cited to instances in which section 208 of the Second 
Restatement and section 2-302 of the U.C.C., which address 
unconscionability, were cited.  In the period from 2003 to mid-2013, there 
were fifty-five cases that cited the Second Restatement sections on capacity, 
duress, or undue influence.280  In the same period, the unconscionability 
sections of the Second Restatement and the U.C.C. were cited 236 times.281  
Without a period for comparison, it cannot be concluded that 
unconscionability has replaced capacity, duress, and undue influence. 
Consequently, the period from 1980 through 1989 was selected for 
comparison.  Using the same database and search terms, the Second 
Restatement sections on capacity, duress, and undue influence were cited 
eighty-two times.282  On the other hand, citations to the relevant sections on 
unconscionability were cited seventy-five times.283  The absolute numbers 
probably tell us little, and any inferences should be made only with great 
caution.  Nevertheless, one interpretation of the relative numbers is that 
unconscionability may be replacing the traditional doctrines of capacity, 
duress, and undue influence.  
If this were the whole story, the ascendency of unconscionability seems 
obvious.  Complicating matters, however, is that many of the 
unconscionability cases arise in the context of compulsory arbitration.  Of 
the 236 citations to unconscionability in the most recent period, 89 were in 
conjunction with arbitration clauses.284  This is approximately 38%.  In the 
earlier period, eleven cases cited unconscionability in the context of 
arbitration.285  This is but 15%.  The general distrust of arbitration by courts 
has been well documented,286 although recent events indicate that this is not 
a position shared by the United States Supreme Court.287  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 280 See supra Part VI. 
 281 WESTLAW CLASSIC, supra note 43 (search “unconscionable & contract & restatement & s208 & 
after 2002” and “unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 2002”). 
 282 Id. (search “capacity & contract & restatement & s15 & after 1979 & before 1990,” “duress & 
contract & restatement & s175 & after 1979 & before 1990,” and “‘undue influence’ & contract & 
restatement & s177 & after 1979 & before 1990”).   
 283 Id. (search “unconscionable & contract & restatement & s208 & after 1979 & before 1990” and 
“unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 1979 & before 1990”). 
 284 Id. (search “unconscionable & contract & restatement & s208 & after 2002”; then filter the results 
for “arbitration”; and search “unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 2002”; then filter the 
results for “arbitration”).  
 285 Id. (search “unconscionable & contract & restatement & s208 & after 1979 & before 1990”; then 
filter the results for “arbitration”; and search “unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 1979 
& before 1990”; then filter the results for “arbitration”).  
 286 See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract 
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There are a number of possible interpretations.  Although causation 
cannot be established, it is clear that the growth in arbitration is correlated 
with increased attempts to invoke unconscionability.  Does this, in itself, 
signal that courts are now more willing to address unfairness under the 
banner of unconscionability in general?  This seems likely, but one would 
have to separate the impact of increased reliance on arbitration as a variable 
from other factors that may explain the rise in reliance on unconscionability 
more generally.288  Nevertheless, more research on this point is warranted. 
B.  Statutory Measures 
This study has focused on case law and the responsiveness of courts to 
contracts in which the benefit of the bargain favors one party over another 
to an extreme degree.  This is hardly a complete picture of the methods used 
in American law to respond either to defects in consent or directly to 
unfairness.  For example, an alternative to duress and undue influences is a 
federally established “cooling-off” period for some sales made in a person’s 
home.289  The goal is to allow reflection after the conclusion of what may 
have been a high-pressure sales pitch.290  This is hardly a pervasive 
safeguard and, in fact, would not be applied in any of the cases encountered 
in this project.  
At the outset, this Article discussed the gap between consent and 
preferences and how that relates to defects in consent.  A great deal of 
statutory law is designed to respond to the gap through disclosure 
requirements, which can assist in more rational decision making.  
Disclosures can range from warnings about health hazards to loan terms and 
nutritional information.291  These requirements increase the amount of 
available information and lower the costs for contracting parties seeking to 
discover information.  With this information, manifestations of consent may 
be more aligned with actual preferences.  
                                                                                                                           
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469; Charles L. Knapp, Blowing 
the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
609 (2009). 
 287 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 288 The existence or non-existence of unconscionability is a decision for the court. 
 289 Possibly the best known “cooling-off” period is that applied by the Federal Trade Commission to 
door-to-door sales.  See FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at 
Certain Other Locations, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (2015).  It allows consumers to change their minds within 
three days.  Id. 
 290 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 706 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
 291 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2235A (Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2500-A (Supp. 
2014). 
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In many instances, rather than address consent as such, the law goes 
directly to what concerns us about defects in consent—the actual outcome.  
For example, in some states, price ceilings are placed on certain goods 
during times of emergency.292  Again, the purpose is to avoid an extreme 
imbalance in the division of the benefit of the bargain when one party has 
little bargaining power.293  Usury laws that place limits on the interest rates 
that may be demanded by lenders also tend to directly offset what some 
would regard as exploitation flowing from unequal bargaining power.294  
Required warranties and the potential for tort claims based on product 
liability can also be seen as part of the process of encouraging fair terms in 
exchanges. 
VIII.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
What can ultimately be said about American law and defects in 
consent?  First, aside from statutory law, defects are only addressed when 
individuals ask for them to be addressed, and it is likely that there is a 
socioeconomic bias with respect to who does ask.  When questions of 
capacity, duress, or undue influence do make it before a court, perceived 
unfairness is one way in which the benefit of the bargain can influence the 
outcome.  On the other hand, the sample drawn here composed of relatively 
recent cases suggests that courts are reluctant to intervene on the basis of 
any of these theories, especially if the background or status of the 
complaining party suggests that they were capable of resisting the 
pressures.  The principal exceptions are those in which the parties have a 
confidential relationship.  Intervention, when it does occur, seems more 
likely to fall under the rubric of unconscionability.  
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 292 See Rebecca H. Benavides, Summary of State “Price Gouging” Statutes and Regulations, ABA 
(Mar. 31, 2006), http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-fe/pdf/programs/spring-06/price-
gouging-statutes.pdf. 
 293 Interestingly, in some instances provisions for excessive liquidated damages are not enforced, in 
part, because they may reflect unequal bargaining power.  See, e.g., In re DirecTV Early Cancellation 
Litig., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing California’s “fundamental policy of 
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 294 See, e.g., Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 883 P.2d 960, 969 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he purpose of the usury law 
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